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Abstract
Marginal productivity reward has been justified either as a way of
ensuring eﬃciency or of respecting people’s self-ownership. Both these
arguments have their limitations. In this paper we present a new and
more general justification of marginal productivity reward that avoids
the limitations of the traditional arguments.
1 Introduction
Most people support some degree of redistribution, but typically also agree
that people should be rewarded in accordance with the eﬀort they exercise.
Thus a fundamental question in the design of redistributive mechanisms is
to what extent individual eﬀort should be rewarded. One prominent answer
to this question is that ideally people should be rewarded with their mar-
ginal productivity. This answer has traditionally been given two types of
justifications. First, marginal productivity reward has been justified by eﬃ-
ciency considerations. Standard economic theory tells us that if we deviate
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from marginal productivity reward, then there may be oversupply or un-
dersupply of eﬀort. Marginal productivity reward, however, ensures Pareto-
eﬃciency. Secondly, it has been justified by equity considerations. According
to some theories of distributive justice, in particular libertarianism (Nozick
(1974)), marginal productivity reward is the only way to respect people’s
self-ownership (see also Kolm (1996)).
Both these arguments have their limitations. The eﬃciency argument
only provides a justification for marginal productivity reward in situations
where there are incentive problems. In situations where the supply of eﬀort
is inelastic, there is no eﬃciency reason for rewarding eﬀort with its marginal
product. The equity argument is problematic because it relies on some very
controversial normative assumptions. Only people accepting the basic idea
of full self-ownership and the view that full self-ownership implies marginal
productivity reward, would be convinced by the libertarian equity argument.
This position, however, is rejected both by utilitarians (for example Mirrlees
(1971), Harsanyi (1978) and Broome (1991)) and liberal egalitarians (for
example Rawls (1971), Fleurbaey (1995) and Moulin and Roemer (1989)).
In this paper we present a new and more general justification for mar-
ginal productivity reward. The justification applies even in the absence of
incentive considerations and it relies on a much less controversial norma-
tive assumption than the self-ownership argument. We show that marginal
productivity reward follows from a very appealing requirement, namely that
people always should experience an increase in their post-tax income when
they increase their eﬀort. We name this the non-negative reward require-
ment. To illustrate, consider two situations a and b, where you work harder
or longer hours in b than in a and thus have a higher total production in b
than in a. The requirement then states that your post-tax income in b should
not be lower than your post-tax income in a.
We present the formal framework in Section 2 and the proposition in
Section 3. Section 4 provides some discussion of how to interpret the result.
2 Formal framework
Consider a society with a population N = {1, ..., n}, n ≥ 2, where person i’s
eﬀort is ei and e = (e1, ..., en) is the eﬀort distribution in situation e. Let
Ω be the set of all eﬀort distributions. We assume that all individuals can
choose between all eﬀort levels ei ∈
£
emin, emax
®
⊆ <, where < is the set of
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real numbers. The pre-tax income for each individual i, fi :
£
emin, emax
®
→
< is continuous and strictly increasing in eﬀort. Our object of study is a
redistribution mechanism F : Ω → <n, where Fi(e) is the post-tax income
of person i in situation e. F satisfies the no-waste condition
Pn
i=1 Fi(e) =Pn
i=1 fi(e), ∀e ∈ Ω.
3 Rewarding eﬀort
We argue that any redistributive system should aim at satisfying a minimal
reward condition saying that persons increasing their eﬀort, and thus increas-
ing their pre-tax income, should not experience a decrease in their post-tax
income. In other words, if your eﬀort is higher in one situation than another,
then your post-tax income should at least not be lower in the situation where
you exercise more eﬀort. Formally, we can write this requirement as follows.
Non-negative reward (NNR): For any e, e˜ ∈ Ω and j ∈ N , where e˜j >
ej → Fj(e˜) ≥ Fj(e).
Surprisingly, it turns out that the non-negative reward requirement im-
plies marginal productivity reward, and thus is incompatible with anything
else than lump sum redistribution.
Proposition 1 A redistribution mechanism F satisfies NNR if and only if
eﬀort is rewarded with its marginal productivity.
Proof. The if part of the proposition is trivial. Hence, we will only prove
the only-if part.
(i) Suppose there exist e, e˜ ∈ Ω and k ∈ N such that e˜k > ek and
Fk(e˜)−Fk(e) 6= fk(ek)−f(ek). Assume that Fk(e˜)−Fk(e) > fk(e˜k)−fk(ek).
(ii) Consider a new situation eˆ ∈ Ω such that eˆk = e˜k + ²
and eˆi = ei + ²,∀i 6= k
(iv) By NNR, Fk(eˆ) ≥ Fk(e˜) and Fi(eˆ) ≥ Fi(e),∀i 6= k.
(v) By no-waste
P
i [Fi(eˆ)− Fi(e)] =
P
i [fi(eˆi)− fi(ei)]. By rearranging,
this can be written as Fk(eˆ)−Fk(e)=
P
i [fi(eˆi)− fi(ei)]+
P
i6=k [Fi(e)− Fi(eˆ)].
(vi) By continuity of f , for a suﬃciently small ²,
P
i [fi(eˆi)− fi(ei)] =
[fk(e˜k)− fk(ek)] + ²ˆ, where ²ˆ < [Fk(e˜)− Fk(e)] - [fk(e˜k)− fk(ek)]. Hence, by
(v), we have that Fk(eˆ)− Fk(e) < [Fk(e˜)− Fk(e)] -
P
i6=k [Fi(e)− Fi(eˆ)]. By
(iv),
P
i6=k [Fi(e)− Fi(eˆ)] ≤ 0. Hence, Fk(eˆ) − Fk(e) < Fk(e˜) − Fk(e), i.e.,
Fk(eˆ) < Fk(e˜). But this violates NNR, as stated in (iv).
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(8) The proof is symmetric in the case where Fk(e˜) − Fk(e) < fk(e˜k) −
fk(ek), and the result follows.
4 Discussion
The underlying intuition of the proposition is that any non lump-sum re-
distribution, that is, any system of redistribution where your net transfer
depends on your eﬀort, creates interdependences between the individuals in
the economy, and the existence of such interdependences makes it impossible
to satisfy the non-negative reward requirement.
To illustrate, consider a very simple economy with two individuals, person
1 and person 2. Individual i has the pre-tax income function f(wi, Li) =
wiLi, where wi is person i’s marginal productivity and Li is person i’s labor
eﬀort. To make this an interesting case, assume that the two individuals
diﬀer in marginal productivity, i.e., w1 6= w2 (even though the proof does
not rely on this assumption). Moreover, assume that the government policy
is limited to a linear tax scheme, where the tax income is shared equally
among the two individuals in society. The post-tax incomes are then given
by F1 = w1L1(1−t)+ w1L1+w2L22 t and F2 = w2L2(1−t)+
w1L1+w2L2
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t. It is easy
to see that in this case, there is no redistributive tax scheme that satisfies the
requirement of non-negative reward. For any positive t, there are situations
in which person 1 has a lower post-tax income in a situation with high labor
eﬀort than in a situation with low labor eﬀort, and similarly for person 2.
The reason is that this redistributive mechanism creates an interdependence
between the two individuals. The increase in post-tax income due to an
increase in a person’s own labor eﬀort will sometimes be oﬀset by a decrease
in post-tax income due to a reduction in the other persons labor eﬀort. The
only way of avoiding this possibility is to have a the tax rate equal to zero
and thereby eliminating the interdependence. Our proposition shows that
this is not only a feature of a linear tax scheme with uniform transfers, but
applies to any redistributive mechanism that does not rely on lump sum
redistribution. In this respect, notice that we do not require the post-tax
income of all individuals to be positive in all situations. We only require
that the redistributive system balances, i.e., that the sum of post-tax incomes
cannot exceed the sum of pre-tax incomes.
An alternative interpretation of the idea of non-negative reward, is the
view that only in cases where we have a unilateral increase in eﬀort should we
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demand no decrease in a person’s post-tax income. This very weak require-
ment does not imply marginal productivity reward and is consistent with any
reasonable redistribution mechanism. But at the same time, we doubt that
it captures all of our moral intuitions on how to reward eﬀort. We find the
idea that an increase in eﬀort should imply no decrease in post-tax income,
independent of what others do, extremely attractive, and thus we do believe
that it is of much importance to observe that lump sum redistribution is the
only redistributive policy that has this feature. There are some other prob-
lems with lump sum distribution, however, both from an an informational
and distributive point of view, and thus it may be that it is impossible to
satisfy all reasonable requirements in the design of a redistributive system.
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